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Physicalism and Patent Theory
Christopher A. Cotropia*
United States patent law’s view on the need for a physical embodiment
of the invention, and the continued production and use of an embodiment, has
varied over the last two centuries. In the early days, the requirement for
“physicalism” was high, with the inventor being required to actually reduce
the invention to practice prior to patenting, and enforceability was tied to
“working” the claimed invention. By the early 1900s, these requirements of
physicalism disappeared. This changing view on physicalism speaks volumes
as to which major patent theory the law emphasizes, with physicalism
supporting the incentive to invent theory and the shift away from this
physicalism bringing the disclosure theory to the forefront. This interplay
between physicalism and patent theory, particularly regarding post-issuance
physicalism, not only explains the past, it also describes the current discourse
regarding, and legal reaction to, non-practicing entities (“NPEs”). Decisions
such as eBay v. MercExchange, denying exclusivity to NPEs, once again
emphasize physicalism and are interrelated to the incentive to invent and, in
turn, downplay the disclosure theory and question its current validity as a
patent policy goal.
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INTRODUCTION
Many recent patent law discussions concern patent holders
that are not producing the patented invention.1 Instead, these
patentees choose to only assert their patents. These non-practicing
entities (“NPEs”), often referred to as “patent trolls,” are blamed for
many of the patent system’s current ills.2 Part of the problem with
such patent holders, critics argue, is that they impede socially
beneficial activity by suing and blocking others from making the
invention while not providing anything in return.3 Their nonproduction, while holding and asserting patent, is considered by many
a major problem.4
This discussion about NPEs can benefit greatly by taking a
broader look at the patent and real world activity surrounding it. A
unitary focus on the physical requirements of patent law—particularly
1.
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 649–52 (2014).
2.
See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014) (describing these concerns about NPEs).
3.
See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 394 (2014) (noting that sixty-two percent of NPE lawsuits involve software
patents).
4.
See Letter from Fifty-One Legal and Economics Scholars Who Study Innovation,
Intellectual Property Law, and Policy, to Congress (Mar. 2, 2015) (http://www.utdallas.edu/
~ugg041000/IPScholarsLettertoCongress_March_2_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PC7B-T89A])
(“Estimates based on surveys, on firm 10-K filings, and on stock prices suggest that PAE
litigation has been costing firms tens of billions of dollars per year since 2007.”).
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physical implementation of the invention both prior to, and after,
patenting—can give a holistic view of the degree of “physicalism”5 to
which the patent system subscribes at any given time. Defining the
patent doctrines that either promote or pull back from such
physicalism also allows exploration of physicalism’s ties to patent
theory. Physicalism then becomes a tool, grounded in patent policy
specifics, that can be used in various ways to evaluate and address
concerns like NPEs.
United States patent law’s view on the need for a physical
embodiment of the invention, and the continued production and use of
an embodiment, has varied over the last two centuries. Early in patent
law’s history, the requirement for “physicalism” was high. The
inventor was required to actually reduce the invention to practice
prior to patenting, and enforceability was tied to “working” the
claimed invention.6 As time moved on, these requirements of
physicalism disappeared. Courts deemed the patent document itself as
a constructive reduction to practice, and the patentee could choose to
not make or use the invention and still prevent others from doing the
same.7 The patent document became the ultimate required “product”
of the system.
This changing view on physicalism speaks volumes on the
primacy and interpretation of the disclosure theory of patent law and
how it ranks vis-à-vis the other major patent theory—the incentive to
invent. The early need for physical embodiments and continued use of
the invention emphasizes the incentive to invent theory and a very
three-dimensional disclosure—the actual product or process.8 The
eventual shift away from this physicalism brings traditional disclosure
theory to the forefront. The emphasis is now on the patent text, and
its required robustness, to both act as a proxy for manufacture of the
invention and provide enough detail to others to eventually engage in

5.
As will be explored further infra, “physicalism,” in the context of this Article and
patents, is the view that the invention exists outside the patent—that there is a physical
embodiment of the invention.
6.
Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights
and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 187–90, 213–14 (2004); William Macomber,
Reduction to Practice of Patentable Inventions, 63 U. PENN. L. REV. 353, 354–56 (1915); Warren
H. Willner, Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Constructive Reduction to Practice, 36 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 618, 618–19 (1954).
7.
See Willner, supra note 6, at 621–22; Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
8.
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1855, 1897 (2012) (“The incentive-to-invent story assumes patent law will use this contextualized
invention and demands that patent law provide protection for an invention that is both created
and eventually sold to the public.”).
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such manufacture upon the patent’s expiration.9 The incentive to
invent theory is, in turn, not directly implicated by the patenting
requirements, and the emphasized disclosure is a public, twodimensional description.
This interplay between physicalism and patent theory,
particularly regarding post-issuance physicalism, not only explains
the past, but it also describes the current discourse regarding, and
legal reaction to, NPEs. Put simply, the application of decisions such
as eBay v. MercExchange,10 de facto denying exclusivity to NPEs,11
once again emphasizes physicalism and is interrelated to the incentive
to invent and, in turn, downplays the value of the patent disclosure by
itself. And by recognizing this linkage between physicalism and patent
theory, the disclosure theory, and its validity as a policy goal, is
brought into the NPE debate.12
This Article proceeds as follows: First, Part I of the Article
defines physicalism in the context of patent law and describes how
doctrinal movements in the 1800s and 1900s brought patent law
closer to, and then further from, physicalism. This analysis locates
patent law’s physicalism in various doctrinal discussions such as the
actual reduction to practice and working requirements. Part II takes
physicalism and links the doctrinal movements around it to patent
theory.13 As patent law moves toward physicalism, it emphasizes an
incentive to invent theory framework; when it moves away from
physicalism, the patent system necessarily emphasizes the disclosure
theory. The Article then, in Part III, examines the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in eBay v. MercExchange and the de facto use
requirement arising from that decision to provide an example of the
descriptive and explanatory power of looking at physicalism in patent
law.

9.
See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944):
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers
a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a
trade secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient
detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the
monopoly has expired . . . .
10. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
11. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2016) (establishing the de facto use requirement for an
injunction empirically).
12. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1360–61
(2013) (cataloging the anti-patent aspects of the paper patent doctrine).
13. This Part of the Article benefits greatly from Professor John Duffy’s earlier discussions
regarding the “paper patent” doctrine. See generally id.
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I. PHYSICALISM AND PATENT DOCTRINE
Patent law includes doctrines that define what is required
beyond the patent document itself to both initially obtain a patent and
then to enforce it. Early patent law required both an actual reduction
to practice of the invention to receive a patent and then continued use
of the patented invention to enforce the patent.14 Both of these
required activities outside the patent introduced a physicalism in
patent doctrine—requiring the invention to exist in physical space
beyond the patent itself. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, these
physical requirements for patent protection began to disappear, and
patent doctrine moved away from such physicalism.15 This movement
to and from these physical requirements in patent doctrine and the
definition of physicalism in the context of patent law are detailed
below.
A. Physicalism Defined
Physicalism, as used in this Article and in the context of
patents, is the view that the invention exists outside the patent—
there is a physical embodiment of the invention.16 Physicalism

14. Bracha, supra note 6, at 187–90, 213 (detailing this historic development from
England, to the colonies, to the states, and to federal patent law).
15. Id. at 226 (noting that federal patent laws did not include “working clauses”).
16. DANIEL STOLJAR, PHYSICALISM 16 (2010) (defining physicalism as the belief that
“everything here is physical . . . everything here is necessitated by the physical”); see also Daniel
Stoljar, Physicalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward Zalta ed., 2009) http://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/ [https://perma.cc/X87J-PGEK] (“Physicalism
is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that
everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical.”). Physicalism is akin to
“materialism,” but physicalism, in some philosophers’ view, includes more than just matter, but
also forces such as gravity. Id. Materialism also suggests a hierarchy of values—suggesting
material items are of more value than intellectual or spiritual pursuits—while physicalism is a
simple statement that all things are physical. Id.
In the patent context, Professor John Duffy labels what I call physicalism as the
“ ‘materialist’ approach to invention.” Duffy, supra note 12, at 1369. Professor Michael Madison
discussed the legal and physical existence of an invention in patent law. See Michael J. Madison,
Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 383–84
(2005) (“In patent law, for example, there is the actual device that the inventor developed, and
there is the legally distinct thing that the patentee owns, which the law knows as the patent
claim.”). Professor Dan Burk has also discussed “the dualism of tangible and intangible property
that undergirds current copyright” through the lens of “new materialism.” Dan L. Burk,
Copyright and the New Materialism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL
GOODS 44, 44 (Jessica C. Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016).
This concept of physicalism is related to what I labeled the “external invention” in a previous
article exploring the relationship between the contents of the patent and external activities and
thoughts of the inventor. See Cotropia, supra note 8.
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describes a manifestation of the invention that goes beyond the
textual and graphical description that appears in the patent itself.
The core components of a patent are the specification, the
drawings (if included), and the claims.17 All of these exist in paper (or
digital) form and are depicted by words or lines on a page.18 These
descriptions of the claimed invention are not the physical embodiment
of the invention. Instead, they are incredibly detailed descriptions and
may include visual depictions of physical manifestations of the
invention.19
In contrast, the invention can also exist in the physical world.
An invented computer circuit can be described textually and drawn in
a patent, but can also exist in real space in the form of a computer
chip.20 A computer circuit may even exist physically as code executing
on a general purpose computer that actually implements the computer
circuit.21 Even a patent claiming a method of doing something—
manufacturing a new drug for example—can have a physical
embodiment of that method: actually making the new drug.22
Notably, physicalism in patent law would view these examples
of physical implementations of the invention, in contrast to the patent
document, as a necessary part of the patent invention. Put another
way, invention, through the eyes of physicalism, necessarily includes
physical manifestations of the invention. Physicalism means that an
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b) (2012) (defining the written description and enablement
requirements for the patent specification to both describe the invention and teach a person
having ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.73, 1.77(b), 1.81 (2015)
(describing the different components of a patent document, including the drawings); Christopher
A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57,
67–74 (2005) (detailing the information about the invention required to be included in the patent
document).
18. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,207,092 (filed Jun. 26, 2012) (methods and compositions for
improving health, containing textual descriptions of the invention and drawings of the chemical
structure of the invention).
19. Cotropia, supra note 8, at 1861 (defining the concept of an “external invention” drawn
from the details of the specification):
The specification is the more robust part of the patent and includes descriptions and
drawings of the state of the relevant technology, references to what has been done
before, any specific implementations of the invention known to the inventor, and a
general description of the purpose or goal of the invention.
20. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,972,338 (filed Apr. 19, 1988) (memory management for
microprocessor system, whose commercial form was Intel’s 80386 microprocessor); Cyrix Corp. v.
Intel Corp., 846 F. Supp. 522, 530 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that “[i]n order to be covered by claim
1 of the ‘338 Patent, [Intel’s] physical embodiment of the microprocessor device must have every
circuit element of the claim . . . .”).
21. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,893,122 (filed Nov. 28, 2008) (virtual computer system and a
method of controlling a virtual computer system on movement of a virtual computer).
22. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,951,403 (filed May 31, 2011) (method of making
pharmaceutical multiparticulates).
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invention is not an “invention” for patent law purposes unless it exists
physically.23
B. Early Patent Law Doctrines Based on Physicalism
Early patent law adhered to the idea of physicalism—requiring
both physical embodiments of the invention prior to patenting and
continued real world use of the patent to enforce the patent.24 The
physical requirement for patent protection was governed by an actual
reduction to practice requirement. And physicality in the form of a use
requirement was a necessary prerequisite to enforcement of the patent
in court.25 Both of these early physicalism-based requirements are
detailed below.
1. Actual Reduction to Practice
The early patent grants in England in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries were based, in part, on demonstrations that the
invention worked and, in some cases, “actually delivered the promised
results.”26 Individual state patent law took a similar approach,
requiring the inventor to actually implement the invention in order to
get a patent.27
Early interpretations of federal patent law continued this
requirement via the actual reduction to practice doctrine. Early patent
statutes required an inventor to make the invention, that is, to reduce
it to practice, before gaining patent protection.28 Courts interpreted
this as an “actual” reduction requirement, which became part of the
definition of “invention.”29 Justice Story, when sitting as a circuit
23. Geoffrey Paul Hellman & Frank Wilson Thompson, Physicalism: Ontology,
Determination, and Reduction, 72 J. PHIL. 551, 551–52 (1975) (explaining that physicalism is the
reduction of all things to expression in physical terms).
24. Bracha, supra note 6, at 187–90.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 189.
27. Id. at 213–14 (noting such a requirement in Massachusetts).
28. Willner, supra note 6, at 618–19; see Macomber, supra note 6, at 354–56.
29. Willner, supra note 6, at 618–19:
Prior to the turn of the century, the courts of the United States had rendered
decisions in patent cases in which the principle was firmly established that (except
where modified by the question of diligence) the inventor within the purview of the
patent law was the one who first adapted and perfected his invention to use; that is,
reduced it to practice.
Willner lists the early cases articulating an actual reduction to practice requirement. Id. at 618
n.1.
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judge, explained that the first who brought “the machine to perfection,
and made it capable of useful operation” was entitled to a patent.30
One was not an “inventor” until she “put the invention into practice.”31
This requirement to “practice” the invention, that is, to make it
physical, was the majority rule in patent law into the early to mid1800s.32 There were a few isolated exceptions, with some courts not
requiring an actual reduction to practice.33
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
adopted this requirement as well—awarding patents to the first to
create a physical manifestation of the invention. Patents went to those
who actually reduced the invention to practice.34 The inventor had to
“perfect the machine” and “make[ ] it capable of useful operation” to
get a patent.35 The “idea” of the invention was not enough—it needed
to be physicalized before patenting.36
Early patent law also required inventors to submit a physical
model of the invention with the patent application. This model,
depicting the invention and demonstrating its operation, was another
physical requirement of early patent law.37 The first federal patent
30. Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 317 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214).
31. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217):
The intent of the statute was to guard against defeating patents by the setting up of a
prior invention, which had never been reduced to practice. If it were the mere
speculation of a philosopher or a mechanician, which had never been tried by the test
of experience, and never put into actual operation by him, the law would not deprive a
subsequent inventor, who had employed his labor and his talents in putting it into
practice, of the reward due to his ingenuity and enterprise.
32. See, e.g., Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1868):
The settled rule of law is, that whoever first perfects a machine is entitled to the
patent, and is the real inventor, although others may have previously had the idea
and made some experiments towards putting it in practice. He is the inventor and is
entitled to the patent who first brought the machine to perfection and made it capable
of useful operation;
Whitely v. Swayne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 685, 687 (1868) (“[F]or he is the first inventor, and entitled
to the patent, who, being an original discoverer, has first perfected and adapted the invention to
actual use.”).
33. See Heath v. Hildreth, 11 F. Cas. 1003, 1006 (C.C.D.C. 1841) (No. 6,309):
I do not consider the expression “reduced to practice” as importing the bringing of the
invention into use. When applied to an invention, it generally means the reducing it
into such form that it may be used so as not to be a mere theory. If a machine be
invented and described in such a manner that it may be made and used, and
especially if a model be made, the invention may be said to be reduced to practice.
34. See Mayhew v. Wardwell, 1869 C.D. 5; Crane v. Whitehead & Atherton, 1875 C.D. 26
(“It must follow, then, as a logical sequence, that a mere application for patent is not a.
‘reduction to practice’ . . . .”).
35. Agawam, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 602.
36. Willner, supra note 6, at 618–19.
37. Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790–1880 (Part I), 65 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 187, 189–93 (1983) (detailing the 1790 model requirement and its application); see also
Alain Pottage, Law Machines: Scale Models, Forensic Materiality and the Making of Modern
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law, in 1790, explicitly included a model requirement.38 This
mandatory nature of models varied under the 1793 Patent Act, but
again became an absolute requirement under The Patent Act of
1836.39 The Act read: “Before any inventor shall receive a patent . . .
[he shall] furnish a model of his invention, in all cases which admit of
a representation by model, of a convenient size to exhibit
advantageously its several parts.”40 A true working model was even
sometimes relied upon to support a claim of actual reduction to
practice prior to filing.41
2. Working Requirement
The early English patent grants included provisions that the
patentee had to continue to practice the patented invention in order to
exclude others.42 These patents contained express “working clauses”
that required the patentee to practice the invention within a predefined period.43 If the patentee failed to work her invention—that is,
go beyond reducing the invention to practice by producing, selling,
distributing, and/or commercializing the invention—then the patent
was nullified and not enforceable.44 In some cases, the patentee was

Patent Law, 41 SOC. STUD. SCI. 621 (2011) (discussing the model requirement as introducing
materialism in patent law).
38. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109–112 (repealed 1793):
That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting the same,
deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a description,
accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the
invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them
invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents; which
specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish
the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable
a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch,
or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the
end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent
term . . . .
39. Dood, supra note 37, at 200, 208.
40. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870) (“[H]e shall moreover
furnish a model of his invention, in all cases which admit of a representation by model, of a
convenient size to exhibit advantageously its several parts.”).
41. Dood, supra note 37, at 189.
42. Bracha, supra note 6, at 187–90.
43. Id. at 188; see also E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the
Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 LAW Q. REV. 141, 153 (1896) (explaining the history of
working clauses in early patent grants).
44. Bracha, supra note 6, at 188; see also D. Seabome Davies, The Early History of the
Patent Specification (Part I), 50 LAW Q. REV. 86, 90, 95 (1934) (describing the requirement of
patent specifications).
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required not only to practice the invention to keep the patent, but also
to produce the invention at a certain, high quality.45
English patents also included a “revocation clause,” which
gradually replaced all working clauses.46 This clause allowed “the
crown or its arm, the Privy Council, [ ] the power to revoke the patent”
under certain circumstances. One such revocable circumstance was
“any failure to introduce an invention within a reasonable period.”47
These clauses “became a fixed feature of all patents of invention” in
England during this time.48
Almost all colonial and state patents included working clauses
as well.49 These, like those in England, required successful practice of
the invention within a specified period of time to maintain
enforceability of the patent.50 Quality requirements were also
prevalent.51
Federal patent law did not include such an explicit
requirement, but courts inferred one in the 1800s. Many cases
predicated the issuance of an injunction for infringement upon the
patentee having put “his patent to practical use.”52 This working
requirement could also be met by the patentee having licensees using

45. Bracha, supra note 6, at 188–89.
46. Id. at 189.
47. Id.; see also WILLIAM MARTIN, THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM 16 (1904) (detailing the
statutory power of the Privy Council to insert revocation clauses into patents).
48. Bracha, supra note 6, at 189–90.
49. Id. at 212–14; see also BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 81–82 (1967) (providing examples of early state patent grants containing
working clauses).
50. Bracha, supra note 6, at 213–14.
51. Id. (detailing such a requirement).
52. See Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 294
(6th Cir. 1896) (“That the grant is made upon the reasonable expectation that he will either put
his invention to practical use, or permit others to avail themselves of it upon reasonable terms, is
doubtless true.”). Notably, even in the late 1800s, some courts held that non-use was irrelevant
for patent enforcement. See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 744 (1st
Cir. 1906) (citing cases).
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the invention with permission.53 Use was thought to be necessary to
preserve the patent.54
The “paper patent” doctrine developed by the courts also
interjected a physical requirement to enforcing a patent.55 As
Professor John Duffy articulated the paper patent doctrine, courts
“distinguished between patents that remain merely pieces of paper
issued by a government agency and those that are made into
commercial products.”56 In some cases, the paper patent doctrine was
similar to a working requirement, denying an injunction to those who
did not commercialize the patented invention.57 In other
circumstances, the doctrine metered out patent rights depending on
the degree of commercialization.58 Courts would give paper patents
narrow claim interpretations or allow the lack of commercialization to
tilt cases toward a finding of invalidity.59

53. Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1886):
The question, therefore, arises whether the court will grant an injunction in favor of
the owner of a patent who has not, after a reasonable time, put it into use, against
another who is using it. I think, under a patent which gives a patentee a monopoly, he
is bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable or
equitable terms, and as I refused an injunction on the motion before the hearing, I
shall refuse an injunction in the interlocutory decree, and allow the defendants to
continue to use the patent on their giving bond as they have heretofore.
54. N.Y. Paper Bag Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. Hollingsworth & W. Co., 56 F. 224, 231 (1st Cir.
1893) (containing a concurrence by Judge Putnam doubting whether a nonuser is “entitled to any
relief at all” under patent law).
55. See id. at 231 (Putnam, J., concurring) (doubting whether, under circumstances of
unexplained nonuser, the case “is not one of a mere legal right,” where the party is left to
remedies at law, “if entitled to any relief at all”).
56. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1379–81 (cataloging the anti-patent aspects of the paper patent
doctrine).
57. See id. at 1380–82 (observing that the courts “were much more hostile to what today
would be considered one objectionable troll-type behavior: the assertion of an uncommercialized
patent against an entrepreneurial firm that made technology actually work in the real world”).
58. See, e.g., Palmer v. Joseph, 233 F. 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1916) (“Exactly as described, we
are satisfied that the patentee’s plan was inoperative, a belief confirmed by the admitted fact
that such exact thing has never passed into commercial use. This action is upon a ‘paper patent’
of the plainest kind.”).
59. See, e.g., Long v. Pope Mfg. Co., 75 F. 835, 840 (1st Cir. 1896):
But, in view of the rapidity with which mechanical improvements advance in this age,
it would establish a very dangerous precedent to give to a mere paper patent, which
has lain dormant for years, a breadth not contemplated on its face, by reason of some
new function discovered long after its issued, and after that function had been availed
of in practice by others;
Hills v. Hamilton Watch Co., 248 F. 499, 504–05 (E.D. Penn. 1918) (“When such doubt is present,
the fact that the patent is a mere paper patent may turn the scale against infringement . . . .”).
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C. Late 1800s and the Fall of Physicalism
These physical-based requirements eroded in the late 1800s
and essentially disappeared by the 1900s, and, in turn, patent law
adhered less and less to physicalism. “Constructive” substitutes for
actual reduction to practice allowed an enabled patent specification to
replace physically building or implementing the invention.60 And
working the patent was no longer a prerequisite for enforcement.61
Essentially, the patent document, by itself, became enough to gain
entrance into the patent system and to prevent others from practicing
the patented invention. Patent law moved away from emphasizing
physicalism in doctrine.
1. Constructive Reduction to Practice
In the late 1800s, courts began to accept an alternative way to
reduce an invention to practice—“constructive” reduction to practice.
An 1872 district court decision was the first to hold that if an
invention created “according to the model and specification filed, . . .
will operate successfully as a practical and useful thing,” then the
“patent is valid” and has been reduced to practice.62 The Supreme
Court came to a similar conclusion in 1888 in The Telephone Cases.63
The Court explicitly rejected a challenge to one of Bell’s patents based
on his failure to actually reduce the claimed invention to practice prior
to filing.64 The Court relied on the patent’s description of the claimed
process as proxy for actually implementing the invention.65
The USPTO also began recognizing constructive reduction to
practice in the late 1800s. The term “constructive reduction to
practice” was first explicitly used by the Commissioner of Patents in
1889, noting that an enabling patent application was adequate
evidence of invention.66 And the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed the doctrine of constructive reduction to
practice as valid in 1909.67 The patent’s specification had become a

60.
61.
62.
17,493).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
1909).

Willner, supra note 6, at 620–22.
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
Wheeler v. Clipper Mower, Etc. Co., 29 F. Cas. 881, 888–89 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872) (No.
Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 533 (1888).
Id. at 534–36.
Id.
Willner, supra note 6, at 622 (citing Elges v. Miller, 1889 C.D. 108).
Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288, 290–91 (1st Cir.
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recognized substitute for physically making or implementing the
invention.68
The patent model requirement also went away in the late
1800s. In 1880, a general model requirement for all patent
applications was dropped by the USPTO.69 By 1900, the invention, for
patent law purposes, could be memorialized and completed completely
on paper—with an enabled patent document explaining how to
physicalize the invention.70 Actual physicalization was no longer
necessary to “invent” and obtain a patent.
2. Non-use Acceptable
In the early 1900s, the courts removed any working or use
requirement to patent enforcement. The key case that made the lack
of such a requirement clear was Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., decided by the Supreme Court in 1908.71 The Court
concluded that a patent owner had no obligation to use the claimed
invention, nor to let others use the invention.72 Analogizing patents to
other property rights, the Court recognized that “the very essence of
the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of
property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”73 A
patentee’s rights are “exclusive, and so clearly within the
constitutional provisions in respect to private property that he is
neither bound to use his discovery himself or permit others to use it.”74
Accordingly, the patentee could enforce her patent, and enjoin others
from using the claimed invention, without ever physically using the
invention herself, or even allowing others to do the same.75 This
requirement of physicality had been unambiguously removed.76
Similarly, the paper patent doctrine began to fall out of
disfavor in the early to mid-1900s.77 As Professor Duffy points out, the
68. Willner, supra note 6, at 622–24.
69. Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790–1880 (Part II), 65 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 234, 271 (1983).
70. Id. at 270–72.
71. 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
72. Id. at 428–29.
73. Id. at 429.
74. Id. at 425.
75. Id.; Lorain Steel Co. v. N.Y. Switch & Crossing Co., 184 F. 301, 302–03 (3d Cir. 1911)
(“Doubtless, in the present case, the complainant was entitled to an injunction restraining
further infringement. It was entitled to that relief whether it made use of its patent or not.”).
76. Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Penalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent
Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1445–47 (2013).
77. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1385–86 (detailing the demise of the anti-patent aspects of the
doctrine).
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erosion of a use requirement in cases such as Continental Paper Bag,
described above, eroded the “anti-patent side of the doctrine.”78 Just as
other use requirements went away, so did the judicial bias against
paper patents.79
II. PATENT THEORY’S VIEW TOWARD PHYSICALISM
Two of the most widely accepted patent theories are the
incentive to invent theory and the disclosure theory. The incentive to
invent theory focuses on using patents to prompt the creation and
eventual production of the claimed invention, while the disclosure
theory sees the public disclosure of the knowledge contained in the
patent itself as the main goal. These theories, and their goals, are not
mutually exclusive, but their emphases are very different. This
difference is what links physicalism with the incentive to invent
theory and, in turn, explains how a lack of physicalism causes patent
law to fall back to the disclosure theory. While the incentive to invent
theory centers on the actual creation and commercialization of the
invention during the patent term, the disclosure theory focuses on the
patent document itself and usage after patent expiration. The same
doctrinal differences explored above are echoed when examining these
two patent theories as they relate to physicalism.
A. Two Prominent Patent Theories
While there are many theories of patent law,80 there are two
main, widely accepted ones.81 The first, the incentive to invent theory,
78. Id. (noting “the gradual conflation of the paper patent doctrine with the quite distinct
rule that patentees are not required to use their patented technology”).
79. Id.; see also Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 286 F.2d 933, 939 (5th
Cir. 1961) (“In a close case the existence of a patent only on paper might tip the scale against a
holding of infringement. But lack of commercial success does not preclude enforcement or
indicate lack of invention.”).
80. For example, there is the prospect theory of patent law, see Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–78 (1977),
commercialization theory, F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–12 (2001), or signaling theory, Clarisa Long, Patent
Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 643–48 (2002).
81. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21
(Comm. Print 1958) (report by Fritz Machlup) (explaining the best known theories of patent
protection); Cotropia, supra note 8, at 1892 (“The incentive-to-invent theory is the classic
justification for the patent system.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–30 (1989) (noting that the
primary justifications for patents are the incentive to invent and disclosure theories); Katherine
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS.
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describes patent law as incentivizing the invention’s creation for the
greater good by getting the invention actually implemented and sold
to the public during the patent term.82 The second, the disclosure
theory, focuses on getting information about the invention out, in the
form of the patent, so that upon expiration the public can enjoy the
patented invention and the knowledge that goes along with it.83
Notably, they are not mutually exclusive—revealing disclosures are
made when an invention is created and sold, and disclosures can
provide the seeds for actual creations and mass distributions.
However, each theory emphasizes something very different and at a
different time—with the incentive to invent theory focused on
activities outside the patent document during the patent term, while,
in contrast, the disclosure theory’s focus is on the patent document
itself and usage of that knowledge after the patent term.
The incentive to invent theory is a classic justification for the
patent system.84 Under this theory, patent law incentivizes the
creation of inventions and follow-on commercialization of these
inventions, often called innovations, by giving the inventor a
mechanism by which she can recoup her development costs:
exclusivity.85 The incentive to invent theory assumes the exclusive
rights to the invention allow the inventor to monopolistically price the
invention—above marginal cost.86 The potential for this additional
L. REV. 81, 104–05 (“Over and over, scholars and courts have explained that the patent system is
justified by the twin theories: ‘incentive to invent’ and ‘incentive to disclose.’ ”).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving the U.S. Congress the power to grant patents
and copyrights in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare.”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2003) (reviewing rationales for
intellectual property and finding the economic rationale most compelling); Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576–77, 1580 (2003); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993
(1997) (“Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to invent and create.”).
83. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
84. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004) (describing the incentive-to-invent theory).
85. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”).
Innovation is technically different than invention in that innovation includes actually bringing
the invention to market and distributing it. Ted M. Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62
STAN. L. REV. 341, 366 (2010). However, the terms are often used interchangeably, and
innovation is at least an indirect product of invention. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 809 (1988).
86. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 927 (2010):
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revenue is what entices a would-be inventor to try to invent.87
Notably, for this incentive to play out and the inventor to recoup
investments via price control, the inventor needs to actually create
and sell the invention.88 The exclusivity the patent grant awards to
the inventor is grounded in the incentive to invent theory.89
In contrast, the disclosure theory describes the patent system
as a quid pro quo between the patentee and the public.90 The inventor
fully discloses her invention to the public in the patent, and in return
she gains exclusivity over the disclosed invention for a limited period
of time.91 Without the promise of exclusivity, the inventor would never
inform the public about the inner workings of her invention for fear of
others appropriating it.92 The public then gets full possession of the
disclosed invention, via the description in the patent, as soon as the
patent’s term expires.93 At that point, the invention truly becomes
part of the public domain.94 The disclosure theory articulates the
invention’s disclosure itself as the justification for the patent system.95

This control allows rightsholders to be price searchers, as opposed to price takers who
must settle for a price equivalent to marginal cost. The law thus allows rightsholders
to engage in monopolistic pricing—or at least pricing that would not be possible
without the market power that intellectual property confers. (footnote omitted).
87. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope,
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 170 (2005) (“The incentive to invent is maintained by the
would-be inventor’s perception that she will get adequate protection to recoup costs.”).
88. See Merges, supra note 85, at 808 (“Through the patent system, society obtains the
benefit of both an innovation (assuming the invention is perfected and introduced for sale) and,
at the very least, an invention-that is, a significant technical advance.”).
89. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 503–04 (2006) (“Under current law, an inventor's incentive to invent is a
function of her expected return under complete patent exclusivity weighted by the probability of
obtaining that exclusivity.”).
90. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944):
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers
a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a
trade secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient
detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the
monopoly has expired . . . .
91. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“In
consideration of [the invention’s] disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the
patent is granted.”).
92. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 556–57 (2012) (“Disclosure theory focuses on the quid pro quo of the patent system:
the inventor receives the exclusive patent right in exchange for fully disclosing the invention to
society, rather than keeping the invention secret (such as with trade secret protection).”).
93. Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1073–74 (2014).
94. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to put the public in
complete possession of the invention . . . so that interference with it may be avoided while the
patent continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent expires.”).
95. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548–50 (2009).
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In theory, the disclosure adds to the public storehouse of useful
knowledge, and without patents prompting such disclosure, such
knowledge would remain suppressed or, at the very least, its
disclosure
would
be
significantly
delayed.96
Patentability
requirements such as the written description and enablement
doctrines,97 which require the patent’s specification to both describe
the claimed invention and teach others how to make and use it,98 are
heavily linked to the disclosure theory.
These two theories are not orthogonal to each other. Doctrine
that emphasizes one theory does not necessarily do so at the expense
of the other. Nor do the theories fundamentally reject the other’s view
of patent law. In fact, by meeting the goals of one theory, patent law
could also further the other.
For example, the physical creation of the invention and its
distribution—both the goals of the incentive to invent theory—often
also disclose the invention to the public.99 Most inventions are “selfdisclosing” in that their sale de facto informs the public about the
invention’s composition and operation.100 The commercialization of the
invention necessarily discloses it.101 Admittedly, some inventions are
not self-disclosing (e.g., an invented process), and thus the patent
document itself may be critical to placing the invention into the public
domain upon the patent’s expiration.102
96. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (stating that additions from
patent disclosures “to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal
that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its
disclosure . . .”). The disclosure can also provide benefits during the patent term, by facilitating
design-arounds. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 624 (2010) (emphasizing that “the patent document has potential immediate value to
the public, which can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe upon the
claims”).
97. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
98. Fromer, supra note 95, at 545–48 (detailing these patentability requirements and their
connection to the disclosure theory).
99. See Strandburg, supra note 81, at 104–06; see also Jason Rantanen, Peripheral
Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16–36 (2012) (detailing the other ways the patent incentive
prompts disclosure beyond the patent itself, such as personal and reputational rewards for the
inventor and marketing advantages for the investor, while maintaining the potential to monetize
the patent).
100. Strandburg, supra note 81, at 105 (“Note, however, that while the incentive to invent is
highly pertinent to such self-disclosing inventions, the disclosure quid pro quo has little
relevance.”).
101. Id. (“Because the free-rider theory assumes that an invention is disclosed and its
reproduction enabled by its mere commercialization, the patent disclosure can add little to
society's store of technical knowledge and serves almost exclusively to define the ‘metes and
bounds’ of the invention.”).
102. Id. at 106 (“Examples of such non-self-disclosing inventions include industrial
processes or complex software programs.”).
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In turn, promoting disclosure can lead to actual creation. In
fact, this is an often described consequence of the disclosure theory.103
The reason patent law wants the invention disclosed is so that others
can use that information to actually implement the invention and
create other inventions.104 Without such disclosures, the invention’s
dissemination may be limited and never improved upon. Disclosure
may also prompt designing around during the patent term.105
However, even with this overlap between the theories, they
each have a very different focus.106 The incentive to invent theory is
centered on the real world creation and distribution of the invention.
This is what the theory emphasizes—the utilitarian benefits of the
invention production.107 In contrast, the disclosure theory stresses the
public benefits of the patent document itself. The knowledge contained
within the patent is the thrust of the disclosure theory.108 This
difference in focus, and its association with the presence or absence of
physicalism, is explored in more detail below.

103. Fromer, supra note 95, at 549–50 (“Patent disclosures act, as one commentator labels it
as an ‘invisible college of technology.’ Use of these disclosures, in turn, speeds the rate of
innovation in society, which is central to economic growth.” (quoting Carolyn C. Cooper,
Nineteenth-Century American Patent Management as an Invisible College of Technology, in
LEARNING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 40, 40 (Ross Thompson ed., 1993))).
104. Id. (“Disclosure of an invention sets out what others have already accomplished,
thereby both revealing information about those discoveries—enabling the avoidance of ‘wasteful
duplication of the original inventor’s research’—and noting, usually implicitly by omission, what
has yet to be done.” (quoting Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2005))).
105. Id. (“Second, the disclosure can stimulate others to design around the invention or
conceive of new inventions—either by improving upon the invention or by being inspired by it—
even during the patent term.”).
106. This difference has been recognized, at least indirectly, by commentators, particularly
those arguing for patent doctrines to promote the disclosure theory. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note
95, at 553:
Until now, much of the academic literature on patent law has addressed the ideal
quid—the scope of the patent right in light of economic concerns generally and with
regard to particular technologies—but not the ideal quo—the structure and content of
invention disclosure and its place in the patent system;
Ouellette, supra note 92, at 556:
[I]f patents provided no innovation incentive, I do not believe that the disclosure
incentive alone would be sufficient to justify the patent system. But given that we do
have an entrenched international patent system—whether it promotes innovation or
not—this Article will probe whether strong disclosure should be a central goal of that
system.
107. Cotropia, supra note 8, at 1898 (“The incentive-to-invent story also assumes that a
product or service embodying the invention will eventually go on sale.”).
108. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 96, at 622 (explaining that the “patent document . . .
discloses the invention to the public”).
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B. Physicalism’s Alignment with the Incentive to Invent Theory
Patent doctrines that require physical embodiments of the
invention line up the patent system with the incentive to invent
rationale. By requiring the inventor to both actually make/practice the
invention and then continue using it, such physicalism-based
requirements tune patent doctrine to the goals of the incentive to
invent theory—creation and commercialization of the invention. The
patent laws, when adhering to physicalism such as in the 1800s, as
seen above, bring the patent system closer to the utilitarian goals of
the incentive to invent theory.
First, requiring actual reduction to practice ensures that all
inventors, in order to obtain a patent, must take a necessary step
toward providing society with an operating invention. Conception and
articulating the invention in detail on paper are common first steps in
giving society the invention to use.109 But actually physicalizing the
invention is a necessary next step.110 A patent system that requires
actual reduction to practice to obtain a patent, as required until the
late 1800s, places patent protection a step further toward the goal of
the incentive to invent theory—getting the invention, in practice, in
society’s hands as soon as possible.111
And this linkage—between the actual reduction to practice
requirement and the incentive to invent theory—falls in line with how
both view the act of inventing. The actual reduction to practice
requirement is predicated on courts emphasizing that the act of
physically manifesting the invention is part of the invention
process.112 There is no “invention” until the concept is put into actual
109. Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127,
1135–37 (2009) (detailing this initial development required to file a patent as the invention’s
“option price”).
110. Such as either making a prototype of the invented electronics, testing the invented
software on a computer system, or mixing small batches of an invented chemical. See
Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 91–94 (2009) (describing
the technological development process in the context of patenting).
111. Id. at 124 (explaining how requiring an actual reduction to practice “increases the
chances of commercialization” of the invention).
112. See, e.g., Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1868):
The settled rule of law is, that whoever first perfects a machine is entitled to the
patent, and is the real inventor, although others may have previously had the idea
and made some experiments towards putting it in practice. He is the inventor and is
entitled to the patent who first brought the machine to perfection and made it capable
of useful operation;
WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 110 (1837) (“The claim of the inventor
arises only on the practical application of a theory, or abstract truth, or elementary property, in
some art, process, or method, which he has invented and put in practice, or some machine or
apparatus, or composition of matter, which he has actually made.”); WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 1
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practice.113 This is similar to how the incentive to invent theory views
invention—the concept is not the end goal. The patent system, under
this theory, is incentivizing physical creation and ultimate
distribution of the invention.114 The incentive to invent story assumes
creation, production, and consumption of the invention—all for
societal good.115
A similar analysis applies to the requirement to work, or to
commercialize, the invention in order to maintain the patent’s
enforceability. Forcing the patentee to practice the patented invention
in order to enforce exclusivity further ensures that patent protection
begets societal use of the invention. This is particularly true with
commercialization requirements, such as those under the paper patent
doctrine and working requirements, where patent law of the late
1800s required the patentee to continue to physically implement the
invention to get the privileges of the system.116 By subscribing to such
physicalism, use requirements fit well with the incentive to invent
theory.
Just as with actual reduction to practice, this linkage is rooted
in the working requirement and incentive to invent theory’s goal of the
patentee providing the invention to society. This is the purpose of the
patent grant under the incentive to invent theory—to get the
invention produced and distributed. And the use requirement
explicitly requires this to happen for the patent to stay enforceable.117
With such a physicalism-based requirement, society gains the benefit
of the patented invention’s usage—particularly during the patent’s
period of exclusivity.
And when the physicalism-based requirements go away, like
they did in the early 1900s, the patent system does not push as hard
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 77, at 116, § 126, at 181–83 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1890); Duffy, supra note 12, at 1368–69.
113. See, e.g., Whitely v. Swayne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 685, 687 (1868) (“[H]e is the first
inventor, and entitled to the patent, who, being an original discoverer, has first perfected and
adapted the invention to actual use.”).
114. Lemley, supra note 82, at 995–96 (noting that by giving inventors “control over the use
and distribution of their ideas,” intellectual property law “encourage[s] them to invest efficiently
in the production of new ideas and works of authorship”).
115. See Cotropia, supra note 8, at 1898–99 (detailing this assumption).
116. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1361–62 (quoting Brenner v. Madison, 383 U.S. 519, 534
(1966)):
If the quid pro quo of a patent is ‘the benefit derived by the public from an invention,’
that public benefit can easily be viewed as including not merely the disclosure
required by the statute to be set forth in the patent document but also the benefit
flowing from the practical knowledge and experience gained from actually building
and commercializing the invention.
117. Bracha, supra note 6, at 187–90.
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toward the goals of the incentive to invent theory. The requirements
for physical creation and commercialization are no longer baked into
the doctrine. Such physical implementation and distribution is not
necessary for patent exclusivity.118 Certainly, the patent itself, and its
exclusivity, can facilitate actual implementation of the invention and
its distribution.119 But these activities are no longer required, and
thus patent law does not have to reach the ultimate, utilitarian goals
of the incentive to invent theory. It may do so via the incentives of
exclusivity, but such actions are not wired into the law—physicalism
is no longer an express part of the doctrine. Instead, the patent, by
itself, can meet the requirements for filing (via constructive reduction
to practice), and the patent is all that is needed to enforce exclusivity
(since there is no use/commercialization requirement).
C. Lack of Physicalism and the Promotion of the Disclosure Theory
When patent law moves away from doctrines based on
physicalism, the law emphasizes the disclosure theory. If a physical
embodiment of the invention is not required prior to patenting, and
the inventor does not have to continue using the invention to enforce
the patent, the only thing the inventor must produce is the patent
itself, nothing more. And the theory that focuses on the patent as the
produced “product” is the disclosure theory.
Constructive reduction to practice equates a robust patent
specification to physically making and implementing the claimed
invention.120 In order to constructively reduce to practice, the patent
specification must contain enough detail to enable a skilled artisan to
actually reduce the patent to practice.121 The doctrine centers on the
level of detail and teaching in the patent disclosure, not inventor

118. See supra Section I.C.
119. Fromer, supra note 95, at 549–50 (observing that patent disclosure can facilitate
invention and distribution, by attracting funding, avoiding wasteful duplication, and inspiring
other inventors to “invent around”).
120. See Macomber, supra note 6, at 357:
We may now safely conclude (1) that before an invention becomes a patentable
invention it must possess, in addition to the mental act of invention or discovery, a
concrete embodiment of the new and useful idea; (2) that the filing of a patent
application disclosing the inventive act and the method of practising the same is
constructive embodiment and reduction to practice.
121. See Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he question is whether
the document discloses the invention of the count by meeting the written description and
enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, for a filed application serves as a constructive
reduction to practice of its content.”).
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activity outside the patent.122 And this is the very thing the disclosure
theory identifies as the main goal of patent law—the patent.123
The rationale behind the shift to constructive reduction to
practice is consistent with the disclosure theory as well. The
conceptualization of constructive reduction to practice was premised,
at least in part, on the patent document being evidence of actual
invention.124 A detailed description of the invention and how to make
it established necessary possession under the law.125 This level of
detail is also what places the invention in the public’s possession upon
expiration—and thus fits nicely with the disclosure theory. The
disclosure theory views the patent system as providing knowledge
usable upon the patent’s expiration, and a constructive reduction
communicates such information.126 The lack of physicalism is of no
concern to the disclosure theory since information is the first order
product of the patent system under the theory.127
A similar line of analysis applies to the removal of use
requirements and such removal’s linkage to the disclosure theory.
When physical use of the invention was removed as a requirement to
enforcement, the courts concluded that the patentee could do what she
wanted with the claimed invention.128 If she chose not to actually
implement or commercialize her invention, and to prevent others from
doing the same, that was her sole prerogative.129 However, she still
needed to draft and submit the patent document to gain such
exclusivity. This view of patent law necessarily emphasizes the
disclosure theory because, without a use requirement, the only thing
122. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(explaining the distinction between information inside the specification versus that outside,
including actual reductions to practice).
123. See Rantanen, supra note 99, at 6 (“First, conventional disclosure theory focuses
entirely on the disclosure of the patent: the information contained in the document itself.”).
124. Willner, supra note 6, at 622–24.
125. Ouellette, supra note 92, at 551 (explaining how current case law views constructive
reduction to practice as sufficient evidence of possession of the claimed subject matter); see also
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 147 (2006) (“Enablement
performs the role of demonstrating what the inventor possessed as her invention when filing her
application.”).
126. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1371:
The rise of constructive reduction to practice and the concomitant entry of paper
patents into the legal system corresponds to a fundamental shift toward what we will
call an “informational theory” of the patent system—i.e., a theory in which the patent
system is justified on the ability of patents to encourage the production and disclosure
of information.
127. Id.
128. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (holding that it
is the privilege of a patent owner to use—or not to use—a patent “without question of motive”).
129. Id.
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society is ensured of getting from the inventor is the patent document
itself—again the goal of the disclosure theory.
As discussed above, it is not that removing physicalism-based
requirements pushes patent law exclusively into the disclosure
theory’s domain. The patent itself will likely lead to some physical
creation of the invention and eventual commercialization.130 The
disclosure theory even recognizes this as a secondary product of the
patent—patent law wants to incentivize disclosure so that others can
eventually practice the invention, particularly after patent
expiration.131 There is some physicalism embedded in the disclosure
theory story. But such physical creation is a secondary goal—a byproduct of the disclosure itself. And once the express physical
requirements are removed, inventions can be patented and enforced to
prevent any physical manifestation of the claimed invention.132
Without these physicalism-based requirements, the patent is the only
assured disclosure. This lack of explicit physicalism causes patent law
to emphasize the disclosure theory first and foremost.
Notably, when physicalism is present in patent doctrine, the
invention is disclosed. Arguably, patent law with physicalism-based
doctrine may provide even more disclosure than a patent system
without.133 In the mid-1800s, when physicalism was at its height,
society was ensured both the patent disclosure and the physical
embodiments of the device. Requirements rooted in physicalism
prompt disclosures of a different kind—how the invention is made and
operates in real space—which may provide even richer information
than just the patent.134
When physicalism is absent, however, the patent theory
emphasized changes. As mentioned above, the two theories—incentive
to invent and disclosure—are not mutually exclusive, and both feed

130. Fromer, supra note 95, at 549–50. Notably, a vast majority of patents are never
commercialized, and many are eventually abandoned due to failure to pay the required
maintenance fees. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521,
1521–24 (2005) (detailing and studying the over half of issued patents whose maintenance fees
go unpaid).
131. Fromer, supra note 95, at 551 (“[E]ffective disclosure in a patent system should tend to
equalize the positions of the initial innovator and potential competitors by granting the latter the
information needed to innovate subsequently in the field.”).
132. Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent
Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1445–47 (2013).
133. Cf. Strandburg, supra note 81, at 103, 104–06 (“[F]or scientists and engineers,
understanding is often, if not virtually always, a hands-on experience.”); see also Rantanen,
supra note 99, at 16–36.
134. Fromer, supra note 95, at 551.
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the other’s goals. But as patent law is tuned—or levers are pulled135—
with regards to physicalism, the law is choosing which theory it
wishes to promote. Patent doctrines that require physicalism, as
detailed above, place the incentive to invent theory front and center,
even if they also further the disclosure theory. In contrast, when
physicalism-based doctrine is removed, patent law shifts its emphasis
to the disclosure theory, with only secondary hopes of meeting the
goals of the incentive to invent theory.
III. RECENT RISE OF PHYSICALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR PATENT THEORY
The two insights detailed above—(1) identifying physicalism
and its absence in patent law and (2) detailing physicalism’s linkage
to patent theory—help to both explain doctrinal shifts in patent law
and contextualize them in patent theory. As an example of the
explanatory power of physicalism, a recent patent law change,
partially driven by concerns over NPEs, is discussed below. This
change can be characterized as moving patent law back to
physicalism. And once so identified, the change also evidences an
underlying, although not explicitly articulated, belief that the
disclosure theory, by itself, cannot justify the patent system.
A. Recent Example of Movement Toward
Physicalism—eBay v. MercExchange
As explained above, the Supreme Court, in its 1908 decision
Continental Paper Bag, removed any vestige of a use prerequisite to
enforcing patent exclusivity. The patent was viewed as a property
right, and the exercise of such rights is not predicated on the need to
use the underlying property—in this case the patented invention.136
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, since its
inception in 1982, has vigorously defended the patentee’s right not to
use and still obtain an injunction.137 The court, which hears all patent
appeals,138 applied a “general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement.”139 This rule was rarely, if

135. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 82, at 1641–42 (identifying “policy levers” that can
be pulled to tailor the patent system to the complexities of the real world).
136. Liivak & Peñalver, supra note 132, at 1446.
137. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
139. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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ever, deviated from, and such deviations were based on concerns over
public welfare or health, not the patentee’s non-use.140
The Supreme Court recently revisited Continental Paper Bag
and the Federal Circuit’s permanent injunction practice in eBay v.
MercExchange in 2005.141 The Court held that the grant of a
permanent injunction in patent cases was not automatic upon a
finding of patent infringement. Instead, injunction decisions must be
made “[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity, [and] a
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor
test.”142 This test required the patentee to show (1) that it has suffered
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.143 The
majority decision did not speak to whether non-use by the patentee
did or did not support an injunction under these four factors.144
However, in a concurrence, four justices suggested that
injunctions may not be appropriate where the patentee is a NPE.145
The concurrence noted that an “industry has developed in which firms
use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”146 And injunctions granted to
these NPEs “can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the
patent.”147
Courts, in applying eBay, appear to have taken the
concurrence’s concerns regarding NPEs to heart. As Professor
Christopher Seaman empirically observed, NPEs “rarely obtained a
permanent injunction after prevailing on liability (16%, 4 of 25 cases),
while other patentees are successful in obtaining injunctions in the
vast majority of the time (80%, 154 of 193 cases)” after eBay.148 Courts
140. See Rite–Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[C]ourts have
in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public
interest.”).
141. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
142. Id. at 390.
143. Id.
144. See John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2111–13 (2007).
145. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
JJ.).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Seaman, supra note 11, at 1988.
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typically find that all four prongs of the equitable test, after eBay,
point toward a denial of an injunction when the patentee is not
producing the claimed invention.149 In such circumstances, courts
conclude that money damages are adequate, an injunction would be
more of a hardship on the infringer, and the public interest is better
served without an injunction.150
Thus, as applied by the courts, eBay has reintroduced a use
requirement to enforce a patent right, and, in turn, reintroduced
physicalism into patent doctrine. This use requirement is not as
strong as it was in the 1800s—the patent is not taken away and the
patentee can still get money damages.151 But, just as before
Continental Paper Bag, the patent system, in most cases, now de facto
requires working the patent invention in order to obtain an injunction
and enforce patent exclusivity. The patentee is required to physically
implement the invention in order to get injunctive relief. The Court’s
decision in eBay, particularly its application, is grounded in a
physicalism-based view of patent law.
B. Accompanying Reemphasis on the Incentive to
Invent Theory and Lack of Appreciation for the Disclosure Theory
Interestingly, this shift back to a use requirement, and the
accompanying return to physicalism, coincides with renewed emphasis
on the goals of the incentive to invent theory. Discussions as to why
injunctions should only be awarded to practicing entities include
declarations that the patent system is meant to incentivize actual
production and distribution of the invention. Simply sitting on the
patent, and not producing, is not the goal of patent law.152 Patent law
149. Id.; see also Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“We take this opportunity to . . . confirm that eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable
harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.”).
150. Seaman, supra note 11, at 1988.
151. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under
some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction
may be appropriate.”). See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases
After eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203
(2015) (reporting the results of an empirical study of ongoing royalty awards after eBay).
152. Stijepko Tokic, The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements Based on
Invalid Patents: The Case of Non-Practicing Entities, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 23 (quoting
Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who
Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 205
(2008)):
As discussed earlier, NPEs do not produce any real product or service and their
prosperity depends on obtaining lucrative settlements and licensing fees. Due to
NPEs’ business model in general, it has been suggested that “the incentive to invent
does not exist for [NPEs,]” and it was pointed out that the exclusive rights granted by
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is meant, according to current discourse, to produce physical
implementation and use of the claimed invention for society’s
benefit.153 The reintroduction of a use requirement is tied to a
reemphasis on the incentive to invent theory’s ultimate goal—the
production of the invention for societal good.
The concurrence’s discussion in eBay contains a similar theme.
This concurrence in eBay disfavors the use of patent law to support an
“industry . . . in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees.”154 Injunctions, in those situations, should not be granted because
society is not getting the fruits of the incentive to invent theory of
patent law.155 The de facto use requirement introduced by eBay is
explicitly supported by the view that the patent system is meant to
incentivize the inventor to produce the claimed invention, not simply
prevent others from producing it.156
The use rule introduced by eBay is meant to counteract such
behavior—assertion by NPEs—and realign patent law with the
incentive to invent theory. The prevalent view is that NPEs do not
provide the social good patents are meant to produce—the production

the federal patent system have not incentivized some of the largest NPEs to innovate
beyond the patents held in their portfolios.
153. See Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of
Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
289, 304–05 (2008):
When the patent troll exercises its exclusive patent rights through litigation, it does
so without conferring any corresponding benefit upon society. . . . Further, the
incentive to invent does not exist for the patent troll whose business model is based
upon revenue generation through licensing and litigation. The exclusive rights
granted by the federal patent system have not incentivized TechSearch, NTP, or
Acacia Technologies Group to innovate beyond the patents held in their portfolios.
None have even gone so far as to practice their patented inventions, so as to have a
credible claim of market share erosion from those they allege to have infringed.
154. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. See Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will Grant
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 81-82 (2007):
The normative implications of how courts view the four factors are clear: post-eBay
courts view the patentee as entitled to an injunction to protect its patented invention
from direct competition. Allowing a direct competitor to violate a patentee’s right to
exclude harms the bedrock view that patents provide incentives to invent and thereby
promote the progress of science.
156. Notably, this might not be directly behind Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in eBay, but the
decision in eBay supports such commercialization goals. See, e.g., Ted M. Sichelman, Purging
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 520–21, 536 (2014) (“[D]enying
injunctions—even to practicing patentees—and limiting damages to levels below that needed for
full compensation may better promote the utilitarian aims of patent law.”).
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of innovative products and services.157 Instead, NPE patent assertions
are net losses for society.158 NPEs are not operating the way the
incentive to invent theory intends.159 There is neither physical
creation of the invention nor ultimate commercial sale—both of which
are the very risks patent law subsidizes by the price controls and
exclusivity under the incentive to invent theory.160 Instead, NPEs, the
narrative goes, produce nothing and use their ability to prohibit others
from producing to simply extract rents.161 Physicalism-based
requirements, such as those introduced in eBay, are meant to
counteract such behavior, and, in turn, push patent law back in line
with the incentive to invent theory. 162
The disclosure theory, in contrast, is still furthered by patent
assertions by NPEs. Even if a patentee is not using the invention, and
thus would be unlikely to get an injunction under eBay, the possible
licensing stream from the patent incentivizes the disclosure of the
invention.163 And this disclosure is the goal of the disclosure theory.
The NPE monetization model, while potentially not as well aligned
with the incentive to invent theory, still fits nicely under the
disclosure theory.164 The patent carrot prompts the invention to be
157. Robin Feldman & Thomas Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1
(“Troll activity is generally reviled by operating companies as falling somewhere between
extortion and a drag on innovation.”).
158. See Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 129 (2010); see also Bessen & Meurer, supra
note 3 (discussing the costs of patent litigation).
159. See Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT 5–6
(2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A6YY-JAE9 ].
160. Tina M. Nguyen, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the
Patent System, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 101, 112 (2012) (“Patent trolls also do not promote
commercialization because they do not market their products, but rather wait in secret for a
market to develop and then demand licensing fees.”).
161. Sichelman, supra note 85, at 368 (“[Patent trolls] tend to exploit litigation and licensing
market defects to extract unwarranted rents from commercializers . . . .”).
162. See Garrett Barten, Permanent Injunctions: A Discretionary Remedy for Patent
Infringement in the Aftermath of the eBay Decision, 16 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (“[T]he
eBay decision . . . effectively stops the proliferation of ‘patent trolls’ . . . .”).
163. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll”
Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 449–52 (detailing the benefits of patent licensing, including the
transfer of information between firms).
164. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1360–61 (“If the documentary disclosure theory is the
foundation of the patent system, then any hostility toward NPEs or trolls is inexplicable.”); see
also Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPS): A
Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 790 (2015) (“Indeed, NPEs
presumably play by the rules: they respect the documentary disclosure theory by providing a full
and adequate disclosure of their claimed inventions along with their patent applications.
However, they do not make any beneficial use of their inventions to promote progress and benefit
society.”).
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disclosed, via the patent, and the public will be able to use this
knowledge to practice the invention upon patent expiration.
Notably, there is little explicit recognition of the resurgence of
physicalism in patent law, via cases such as eBay, and the
accompanying reprioritization of patent theory. Both the introduction
of a use requirement and the rhetoric surrounding it emphasize the
incentive to invent theory. And such a result is not surprising given
the strong tie between physicalism and this theory. What has not been
discussed is the resulting downplay of the disclosure theory. As noted
above, when patent law moves away from physicalism-based
doctrines, the law finds more support from the disclosure theory.
There is, however, no discussion about disclosure theory in eBay or its
implementation by lower courts.165
This doctrinal move means that those critics of NPEs believe
that the disclosure theory, by itself, cannot justify the patent system.
Yet, courts and commentators have not explicitly recognized this fact.
When viewed through the lens of physicalism, decisions such as eBay
place the disclosure theory in the backseat. Patent doctrine becomes
dominated by the incentive to invent theory.
CONCLUSION
Physicalism, in patent law, is the existence of the invention
outside of the patent itself. Patent law has varied its attitude toward
physicalism over the last two centuries, first embracing it in the 1800s
and then moving away from it in the 1900s. Recent patent law
changes, particularly those in response to NPEs, have started to move
the law back toward physicalism. And with this movement comes a
reemphasis on the incentive to invent theory and, in turn, a
downgrading of the disclosure theory. Recognizing both of these
movements—toward physicalism and away from the disclosure
theory—helps better inform debates regarding NPEs and pending
patent reforms to address these patentees. Such framing of patent
doctrines within the context of physicalism, and accompanying
theoretical implications of that framing, can be very useful going
forward.

165. However, Professor Duffy recognized the tension between the broader NPE debate and
the disclosure theory. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1360–61. As he notes, it is difficult to reconcile the
“hostility toward NPEs or trolls” and the disclosure theory. Id. at 1364.

